Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India signals an enormous desire on both sides to bolster their defence relationship and further expand cooperation in maritime security and ocean economy. This is especially important as India aspires to be a cornerstone of regional security and an effective, dependable and credible force to counterbalance China. As for Bangladesh, there seems to a growing recognition that, despite being a smaller country with limited capabilities, it has significant interests in the security of the Indian Ocean and is prepared to forge its own distinct course.
In recent years, India and Bangladesh have made significant progress in enhancing their bilateral relationship, leading scholars to describe the current era as the “golden age of India-Bangladesh relations”. Bangladesh, in particular, has seen its presence and reach in the Indian Ocean expand over the last decade. Like many other countries in the region, it seeks to expand its exports and continue its economic development. Furthermore, the growth of Bangladesh’s economy, largely driven by the export of its well-known readymade garments industry, is expected to drive the country out of the United Nations list of least developed countries by 2026. Roughly 90 percent of Dhaka’s international trade depends on the sea, making the country’s economic growth closely tied to the maritime domain and thus, largely susceptible to the uncertainties that come with it.
With an emphasis on regional and by extension, maritime security, Dhaka published its Indo-Pacific Outlook of Bangladesh in April 2023, outlining the country’s overarching national objectives and approaches. As Bangladesh continues to build its maritime capabilities in alignment with this vision, India stands out as a natural and trusted partner.
Experts assert that in recent times, the bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh have experienced a substantial change, transitioning from a longstanding emphasis on ‘insecurity’ to a deliberate focus on promoting ‘connectivity’ and ‘cooperation’ based on mutual interests and a shared vision. Furthermore, the increasing interdependence of their economic interests with the maritime domain, largely due to their geographical positi0oning, has emerged as a crucial factor for both nations in their shift towards the maritime sphere.
Although many scholars have attributed their growing maritime and security cooperation to China, I contend that their primary focus should rather be on addressing non-traditional security issues such as illegal fishing and human trafficking. By doing so, Dhaka will be able to address its pressing security concerns without getting involved in great power contestation, while also enabling New Delhi to continue its growing role as a provider of maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
New Delhi’s maritime strategy, which aims to deal with both traditional and non-traditional threats while also aiming to maintain a strategically advantageous position in the region, thus, has huge stakes in the preservation of stability in its maritime neighbourhood. This can be seen in India’s recent maritime manoeuvres — be it Operation Sankalp, or Indian Navy’s proactive actions during the hijacking of Malta-flagged Bulk Carrier MV Ruen — demonstrating its modern military prowess and readiness to maintain order in its maritime backyard. These actions have played a pivotal role in legitimising India’s position as the ‘First Responder’ and ‘Preferred Security Partner’ in the Indian Ocean Region.
Bangladesh’s decision to join India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), which aims to act on an entire spectrum of challenges in the maritime domain, underscores the region’s recognition of India as a country that offers assistance to nations in the region, particularly smaller ones, in areas crucial to their economic prosperity, sustainable development, protection against natural disasters, efforts to combat climate change, and safeguarding national assets. Thereby making India a favourable development partner, and not a big brother with deep pockets but dubious intentions.
In recent years, particularly since 2014, the emphasis on maritime capacity development and outreach has increased dramatically, with dedicated national policies enacted to promote the maritime sector’s development. And while the shift in India’s maritime outlook has been simultaneous to, and in many respects accelerated by the strategic imperatives posed by security developments in Indo-Pacific region, its consequences have rippled far beyond security.
The past decade has witnessed a greater policy emphasis on maritime matters, translating significantly into diplomatic outreach in the neighbourhood and also in the wider Indian Ocean region, the most recent being Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India. The belief and understanding that the country’s geographical advantage must be leveraged both in terms of developing maritime connections and bolstering security networks is perhaps more deeply ingrained in India’s policy-making circle more than ever. New Delhi has become gradually mindful about shifting its aspirations of being the “net security provider” to “preferred security partner” and play a more positive, and pragmatic role by providing public goods in the maritime sphere and assisting smaller littoral nations in managing their exclusive economic zones and in natural disasters — leading to the cultivation of special relationships with key partners across the IOR.
Reflecting on the wise words of eminent historian K.M. Panikkar, who underscored the importance of the Indian Ocean for the country and advocated developing requisite maritime power, it is clear that seizing these opportunities and wielding leverage in times of crisis, such as what India faces now, is imperative, now more than ever.
The author is a researcher at the East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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