Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned on Monday as anti-government protesters demanding her resignation roamed the streets of Dhaka. If reports are to be believed, she has already left the country and is heading for London.

This year, the nation witnessed its most severe episode of civil unrest in decades. What began as student protests over the job quota system quickly escalated into a nationwide crisis, exposing Dhaka’s deeper issues including economic instability, rampant corruption, and Hasina’s repeated pattern of stringent crackdowns. By July, the violence claimed at least 150 lives, with several individuals landing behind bars.

The government’s response had been far from ideal, marked with heightened curfew and an Internet blackout, which sparked additional student demands. Sheikh Hasina’s resignation amid growing unrest raises questions about the long-term economic impact on Bangladesh. It is also a big cause of concern for New Delhi to lose a ‘pro-India’ dispensation in Bangladesh at a time when China is busy spreading its footprints in the neighbourhood.

What’s going on?

The unrest initially erupted following a High Court decision regarding the quota system for government job allocations. This system, established in 1972, the year after Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan, reserved 30 per cent of government positions for the descendants of ‘freedom fighters’, those who fought for Bangladeshi liberation. Sheikh Hasina, owing to her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had a personal connection to the quota system.

The quota system remained until 2018, when widespread protests led to its abolition by the courts. However, on June 5 of this year, the High Court reversed that decision, paving the way for its reinstatement. Critics and opposition parties argue that such quotas unfairly benefit the descendants of pro-government supporters and aim to foster loyalty within the bureaucracy, thereby perpetuating the power of the ruling Awami League.

In a period of slowdown in the country’s economy, such a decision was likely to generate significant public discontent, as merit-based public sector jobs are already scarce and highly sought-after.

The widespread discontent and protest led to Bangladesh’s Supreme Court ruling that only five per cent of government jobs should be allocated for freedom fighters’ descendants. It was too little, too late to quell the growing unrest. New demands emerged, including a personal apology from Hasina for the deaths of protesters, the arrest or resignation of implicated law enforcement and government officials, and compensation for the victims and their families. Following Hasina’s inaction, students resumed their protests against what they described as “mass killings, arrests, attacks, and disappearances of students and civilians”.

While some anti-regime analysts have wholly blamed the government for the origin and intensification of the protests, foreign policy enthusiasts have touted a purely externally focused analysis of the deteriorating security situation in Dhaka. Both these analyses offer an overly simplistic view of the ongoing situation, overlooking the complex dynamics of internal affairs-foreign policy politics and socio-economic causes of the protest.

Somewhere between our failure to grasp the genuine grievances of the Bangladeshi masses and our reluctance to acknowledge that there might be a foreign-hand, driven by strategic interest of their own, lies the actual answer.

Lessons and Implications for India

The fall of the Awami League from power as a consequence of the ongoing protest is bad news for India. The Sheikh Hasina government was perhaps India’s closest partner in a neighbourhood fraught with anti-Indian feelings and shifting loyalties.

India, often targeted for behaving like a “big brother” of the region, is now trying to position itself as a reliable and preferred partner. More so, given China’s growing footprint in the region. Sheikh Hasina, in India’s quest, served as a reliable partner. Though attracted by Beijing’s deep pockets, her government had consistently honoured commitments, particularly in the sphere of security. Moreover, her administration granted India access to essential ports, highways, and other infrastructure, which were significant strategic assets for India.

Hasina being in power was especially more important now than ever, due to the growing anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh. Earlier this year, opponents of the Awami League, frustrated by the party’s overwhelming victory in elections, called for a boycott of Indian goods. Over the years, New Delhi had been repeatedly accused of covertly working to maintain Hasina in power.

It is now imperative for India to navigate this sensitive issue with caution, as it is central to the future trajectory of India-Bangladesh relations. Until now, New Delhi’s unwavering support for the Sheikh Hasina government despite allegations of her repeatedly obstructing fair and inclusive elections, has served India well. At least in strategic terms. But now, India must ensure all its eggs are not put in one basket and should have a backup plan in place.

However, it cannot be denied that the current situation following Hasina’s resignation has opened up opportunities for external forces in the region to widen the existing cracks within Dhaka, thereby altering not only the security environment of the region, but also the bilateral relationships.

One such country is China. There is little to no surprise that relations between Sheikh Hasina and Beijing had not been the best so far. Last month, in an unprecedented move, Hasina abruptly returned from Beijing and sparked worldwide speculation about a possible friction between the two countries. Add to this, Hasina’s rather overt declaration that her country would “give priority” to India (over China) in implementing the “Teesta project”, definitely did not sit well with a power and influence-seeking Beijing.

Thus, the theory that China has some hand in the worsening situation in Bangladesh, in an attempt to thwart a “pro-India” government for strategic gain, cannot be entirely dismissed. While the origin of the dissent seems extremely organic and rooted in genuine civic and political factors within the country, there is a possibility that China and other external forces might leverage the dilapidated situation to their advantage, provided they haven’t already begun.

It is, thus, imperative that Indian policymakers assess the potential gains and losses from Sheikh Hasina’s resignation, and come up with a backup plan.

The author is a researcher at the East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.

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Bangladesh protests: Sheikh Hasina was India’s best bet, but now is the time for a backup plan