China’s measured step back in eastern Ladakh marks a departure from its typically assertive military approach as observed in the South China Sea. This shift signals that India’s firm stance coupled with strategic negotiations is yielding results. The recent agreement centres on India regaining access to key patrol areas in the Depsang plains and Demchok, which China had previously dismissed as “legacy issues” and attempted to exclude from disengagement discussions. However, India remained resolute demanding the restoration of its historical patrolling rights, especially across five critical points in Depsang that account for nearly 70 per cent of its territorial claims in the region.
Tactical negotiations and military readiness
After China’s initial refusal to negotiate, India dismissed a proposal for no-patrolling zones, similar to those at Pangong Tso, citing the greater expanse involved. By 2023, however, China softened its stance, influenced in part by India’s strengthened deployments in the Eastern Sector. While cautious in its approach, India’s military has begun a verification process to ensure compliance on the ground.
High-level talks between China and India have resumed with the goal of preventing clashes and restoring peace, potentially through a revised framework to replace earlier agreements that China violated in 2020. For India, successful disengagement and thorough verification could lead to incremental confidence-building measures. However, any major policy changes, such as easing economic restrictions, would require solid assurances of boundary stability. This four-year negotiation process marks a significant win for India compelling China to demonstrate a rare degree of flexibility.
Historical context: Sumdorong Chu standoff
The India-China standoff in Ladakh in June 2020, which led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers in Galwan Valley, is often called “unprecedented.” Yet, a similar conflict occurred in 1986 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Arunachal Pradesh. Known as the Sumdorong Chu standoff, this confrontation shares striking parallels with recent tensions. It began in June 1986 when an Indian Army patrol in Tawang district discovered a Chinese post near the Sumdorong Chu rivulet, challenging India’s assumption of the area as Indian territory. By June 16, reports indicated that around 40 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers were present in the area, prompting an official protest from Rajiv Gandhi’s government. However, Beijing dismissed these claims, asserting that India was encroaching on Chinese land. Diplomatic exchanges ensued as troop deployments intensified, with China increasing its presence to over 200 soldiers by August and constructing helipads and additional fortifications.
Balancing military and diplomatic efforts
India responded by balancing military preparations with diplomatic efforts determined to avoid a repeat of the 1962 war. Despite India’s protests and demands for Chinese withdrawal, negotiations stretched over nine years. Though tensions ran high with troops stationed in close proximity, no shots were fired. India soon recognised the need for sustained military readiness, initiating ‘Operation Falcon’ to deploy troops along high ridges dominating the valley.
Once regarded as neutral ground, the Sumdorong Chu Valley evolved into a contested area for strategic positioning. India had resumed patrolling in 1981 and set up a small post by 1984. But by mid-1986, China had rapidly fortified the area, installing heavy guns and significantly increasing its military presence. This escalation reflected China’s assertion that India, not China, was violating the McMahon Line, which Beijing did not recognise. According to Col Ashish Das of the Assam Regiment as reported in The Print, Chinese soldiers appeared wary and averse to provoking a fight, highlighting the strategic caution that marked the protracted standoff. Ultimately, the Sumdorong Chu incident showed India’s growing resolve and its need for a calculated military response.
Rising tensions and diplomatic efforts in 1987
Tensions escalated further in 1987 when India granted full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh prompting Beijing to ramp up its rhetoric. Western observers speculated about the potential for war, especially given the significant build-up of forces on both sides. China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, issued a stern warning, vowing to teach India a lesson. In response, India’s military initiated Exercise Chequerboard, a large-scale air-land exercise aimed at asserting dominance in the North East. Three Indian divisions were deployed to the Wangdung area, supported by the Indian Air Force. General K Sundarji, the then Chief of Army Staff, emphasised the need for a strong stance, preparing for all contingencies should diplomacy falter, while the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi continued to advocate for peaceful negotiations.
Path to de-escalation
As the crisis unfolded, both nations sought avenues for de-escalation. By spring 1987, China extended a diplomatic “olive branch” to India, signaling a willingness to negotiate. In a speech to Parliament, Rajiv Gandhi balanced calls for a peaceful resolution with a firm stance on national sovereignty. Efforts to foster dialogue included visits by Indian defence minister KC Pant and external affairs minister ND Tiwari to China, aimed at easing tensions and laying the groundwork for a broader peace framework. These diplomatic initiatives ultimately resulted in both sides withdrawing troops and engaging in confidence-building measures, leading to a gradual de-escalation over the subsequent years.
Lessons from the past
The Sumdorong Chu standoff served as a precursor to modern India-China border protocols stressing upon the necessity of maintaining strong military readiness alongside diplomatic negotiation. It highlighted India’s military and political resolve to safeguard its borders while demonstrating that even in highly charged situations diplomatic channels could pave the way for peaceful resolutions.
China’s rare shift from its aggressive posture in eastern Ladakh indicates that India’s firm and strategic negotiation efforts can yield results. The latest agreement centres on India regaining patrol access to the Depsang plains (covering 650 sq km) and two locations in Demchok, areas that China has blocked since 2020. India’s insistence on maintaining its patrolling rights—critical for sustaining territorial claims—led to a standoff, with China dismissing these concerns as “legacy issues” unrelated to current tensions. A proposed no-patrolling zone was rejected by India, as the disputed areas are larger and not comparable to other flashpoints.
India’s determination, coupled with strategic troop deployments in areas like Yangtse, ultimately prompted China to soften its stance. However, verifying these arrangements remains crucial to ensure compliance. While no-patrolling zones have proven effective in previous conflicts, such as the 1986 Sumdorong Chu incident, recent agreements were violated by China in 2020 when it amassed troops in Galwan without prior notification, leading to deadly clashes.
Moving forward, India plans a three-step approach: disengagement, de-escalation and normalisation of ties, although China has yet to formally endorse this process. With patrol rights restored and confidence-building measures established, India may cautiously consider easing economic restrictions. However, further trust-building on boundary protocols and troop conduct along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is essential before any significant policy changes are made, as this four-year effort has already yielded a noteworthy diplomatic victory for India.
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The 1986 India-China standoff and how it is similar and different from the Ladakh one
